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Abstract.  Risk and reliability dominate water supply discussions in the arid western 
United States.  In the past, water managers built additional storage to mitigate supply 
risk.  The optimal, least expensive storage sites have now been taken, and there are 
strong, environmental objections to new facilities.  Reliability of existing supplies is 
further diminished due to concerns about endangered species and global climate change.  
Thus water agencies increasingly turn to contractual mechanisms such as dry-year 
options to manage supply risk in advance of need.  However, although a few water 
agencies across the West have implemented dry-year options, sufficient data for 
conventional econometric analysis do not yet exist.  We thus utilize experimental 
economics to analyze the effect of annual dry-year options on water markets.  How do 
market structure (competitive versus market power) and option contract availability affect 
water price and allocation within a market?  Experiment participants trade stochastic 
realizations of water in a non-uniform double auction parameterized to resemble the 
California water market.  We find that realized gains from trade are on average higher 
when options can be traded, by 11% in competitive markets and by 21% in dominant 
buyer markets.  Findings in this analysis may assist policymakers in preparing for the 
next multi-year drought in California. 
 
I. Introduction 
Water is a scarce resource in California.  Population and environmental demands on 
existing water supplies will continue to increase in the coming years.  Water markets have 
developed in California in response to spatial and temporal variation in precipitation and 
delivery.  Flexible arrangements for trading water, such as option contracts, should even further 
increase allocative efficiency of water over time and space.  Under a typical option agreement, a 
water agency pays an option premium in the fall for the right to purchase water from the seller 
should the water year turn out to be dry.  If the water year turns out to be wet so that the holder 
of the option has sufficient native supplies, the water is neither transferred nor paid for, but the 
buyer still pays the seller the option premium.  The option value represents the value to the buyer 
of sharing the risk of water supply uncertainty with the seller (Howitt 1998). 
In this paper we use experimental economics to elicit information on efficiency gains 
from the use of options in water markets.  Specifically, we use the controlled laboratory 
  1environment to isolate the effects of market concentration and contract availability on the 
efficiency of markets, in a way that is impossible with the minimal data on existing water options 
contracts that is currently available.  The laboratory allows us to observe behavior in the 
presence of input supply uncertainty, where the uncertainty is driven by stochastic realizations of 
a natural resource input.  Variability in water supply from year to year in California creates non-
convexities which may lead to different outcomes than what we would expect to observe in a 
static environment with no uncertainty.  We also alter the structure of the market in half the 
experimental sessions, to observe what happens in the presence of a single dominant buyer.  This 
is in response to the reality that existing bilateral options in California are primarily purchased by 
a single entity, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD).  Thus, 
experiments allow us to test for the first time the effects of market structure and contract 
availability on water market efficiency.   
The article is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the importance of options 
to the California water market and the reasons for conducting a laboratory experiment to 
study them.  Section 3 describes the parameters and procedures employed in the 
experiment.  Section 4 describes the results.  Section 5 concludes. 
II. Background 
The first formal instance of water transfer under dry-year options in California 
occurred at the tail end of the multi-year drought of the early 1990’s.  The California 
Department of Water Resources (CDWR) implemented a dry-year options bank in the 
fall of 1994.  Ten agencies purchased options to buy water with an exercise date of May 
1995 from five sellers (Jercich 1997).
1  Although none of the options were exercised due 
                                                 
1 The option price was administratively set at $3.50/af by the DWR after consultation with the buyers and 
sellers.  The exercise price was $36.50-41.50/af.   
  2to late rains in the spring of 1995, the presence of interested buyers and sellers indicates 
there could be interest in a state-sponsored options market again in response to the next 
multi-year drought.   
Although the CDWR does continue to offer a Dry Year Water Purchase Program 
under which it facilitates water transfers during drought years, state-sponsored dry-year 
transfer activity since the drought option bank of 1994-95 has been minimal.
2  However, 
several California urban water agencies have entered into bilateral temporary transfers of 
water with agricultural water users which have many of the key characteristics of annual 
water options agreements.  The San Diego Counter Water Agency receives up to 200,000 
acre-feet (af) annually from Imperial Irrigation District under a 75-year contract, through 
fallowing during the first 15 years and through efficiency improvements in later years 
(SDCWA 2002).  MWD has a 35-year fallowing agreement with irrigators in the Palo 
Verde Irrigation District , for up to 111,000 af annually (MWD 2007).  MWD also signed 
annual option agreements with Sacramento Valley irrigation districts in 2003 and 2005 
and exercised the option on 147,2000 af in 2003 (MWD 2003).  This evidence of bilateral 
option contract activity suggests that the California water market may have developed to 
the point that water agencies who would benefit from annual dry-year options are able to 
undertake negotiations and implement such contracts without state involvement.   
Regardless of whether future option agreements take place under the sponsorship 
of a state agency or bilaterally, there will be increased option activity in the future, 
because options have several important advantages over short-term leases and permanent 
transfers.  Options where water is only transferred during dry years when water has the 
                                                 
2 In 2001 and 2002, the only two years since 1994 that have been categorized by CDWR as dry, 
approximately 114,000 af and 17,000 af, respectively, were delivered under the Dry Year Water Purchase 
Program (CDWR 2004a, CDWR 2004b). 
  3highest scarcity value are less objectionable to exporting communities than permanent 
transfers, or than leases which occur every year (Howitt, Moore, and Smith 1992, Dixon, 
Moore, and Schechter 1992, Coppock and Kreith 1993).  Options often require less 
regulatory oversight than permanent transfers, as impacts to the environment and third 
parties are smaller when transfers are temporary (Hanak 2005).  Finally, the San Luis 
Canal, the state-operated, 500-mile canal which conveys water from the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin River Delta to population centers in southern California is more congested in wet 
years, making conveyance in dry years easier to acquire.  
Options negotiated in advance and contingent upon future water availability have 
two advantages over short-term leases negotiated only in dry years, after water conditions 
are known.  First, time-consuming negotiations over price and terms of a water transfer 
occur in advance of when the water is needed.  Second, an option premium which is paid 
to the seller regardless of whether the water is transferred could help resolve different 
preferences of buyers and sellers regarding the timing and manner of transfer.   
An example of how the options structure could facilitate short-term transfers is 
the CDWR Emergency Drought Bank of 1991, which was the precursor to the 1994 
Drought Options Bank discussed above.  The 1991 Drought Bank was formed quickly 
during the spring of 1991, when it became clear that 1991 was going to be as dry as the 
three previous years had been.
3  The Drought Bank was to facilitate the short-term 
transfer of water from low-value agricultural users to higher-value agricultural and urban 
                                                 
3 In 1991, the first year of the Drought Bank’s operation, CDWR acquired 821,045 af from willing sellers 
at a price of $125/af.  CDWR delivered 389,770 af to 12 urban and high-value agricultural agencies at a 
price of $175/af.  The difference in sale and purchase price covered administrative costs and conveyance 
losses through the Delta.  The difference in sale and purchase quantity is due to carriage losses through the 
Delta and the fact that less water was ultimately demanded by contractors than originally expected.  
(264,000 af was kept in storage until the following year.)  The Drought Bank also operated in 1992 and 
1994, though on a more modest scale (Jercich 1997). 
  4water users on a temporary basis.  Contracts were finalized and signed only weeks before 
water was transferred.  Howitt, Schechter, and Moore (1992) report that buyers and 
sellers alike would have preferred more time for negotiations and greater certainty earlier 
regarding terms of water transfer. 
Justification for experimental approach.  All indications are that water in 
California will become increasingly scarce over time. Analysis of existing option trading 
activity in California would provide valuable information to policymakers regarding who 
benefits from option agreements, and what impediments prevent more extensive use of 
such flexible contract arrangements.  However, although use of option agreements is 
growing, the number is still small enough that formal quantitative analysis of existing 
data is difficult.  In California, even during dry years, markets are still relatively thin; 
trades that occur through market-based prices rather than administratively set prices are 
even rarer.  Further, because market agents are often reluctant to reveal transaction prices, 
there are very few observations of water trades, let alone water options, to provide a basis 
for econometric estimation.  Two recent studies have analyzed water options (Watters 
1995, Villinski 2004), but neither study was able to perform formal tests of efficiency, for 
lack of sufficient data. 
Due to this lack of data, we turn to experiments to address the question of whether 
sufficient gains from trade might be generated from more widespread use of annual dry-
year options. Experiments have been used successfully in the past to test alternative 
institutional designs and facilitates the design of workable policies before they are 
needed.  Recent examples include Murphy et al. (2000) on the benefits of water market 
implementation and Poe et al. (2004) on the design of ambient-based pollution controls.  
  5Laboratory experiments are politically and financially less expensive and yield faster 
results than immediate implementation of a new market institution in the real world.  
Experiments allow policymakers to explore the viability of new market institutions under 
controlled experimental conditions, allowing them the opportunity to mitigate unforeseen 
problems before costly or irreversible decisions have been made. 
III. Experimental Design 
Parameters. We are interested in what effect the ability to trade annual options 
would have on the California wholesale water market.  Purchasers of annual water 
options in California are likely to be high-value agricultural and urban water agencies.  
Sellers of water options in California are likely to be irrigation districts whose farmers 
can to some extent fallow lower-value crops, and the decision to fallow can be made just 
before planting would have occurred. 
The experimental setting is a stylized model of the California water market.  
Buyers have value functions parameterized to mimic the incentives of urban and high-
value agricultural water agencies who are willing to purchase water if the price is 
sufficiently low; sellers have cost functions parameterized to mimic the incentives of 
low-value agricultural water agencies who are willing to sell if the price is sufficiently 
high.  Supply is more elastic than demand in our model, as is the case in the California 
water market. 
The water and option auctions in this experiment reveal participants’ willingness 
to pay, and sellers’ willingness to accept, under four different market structures that are 
described in greater detail below.   
  6The most notable feature of water supply in the western United States and 
California in particular is supply variability over time and space.  Our experiment 
captures temporal fluctuations by varying the initial endowment of water subjects receive 
at the start of each period.  Subjects’ initial endowment of water has a uniform 
distribution reflecting three states of nature: dry, normal and wet.
4  Our experiment does 
not include a spatial element, as we model options traded at a single location.  It is true 
that option value and usage would vary by location depending on hydrological 
conditions, storage reserves, and physical and financial constraints on conveyance.  
However, this analysis addresses the effect of option availability on water markets, and 
how impacts might vary with different market types.  Multiple pricing points would have 
added complexity to the experiment without yielding much additional information.   
Procedures. We conducted experiments in the fall of 2006 and the spring of 2007.  
Subjects were drawn from the undergraduate student population at the University of 
California, Davis at California State University at Sacramento.
5  Subjects were 
guaranteed a fee of $10 for arriving on time to their session.  They also had the possibility 
of earning additional money during the experiment depending on their performance.  
Advertised average earnings for the experiment were $30, for a two-hour time 
commitment.  Experimental sessions were conducted using the software program Z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007).   
                                                 
4 CDWR classifies water years as dry, critically dry, above normal, below normal, or wet using two indices, 
the Sacramento Valley Water Year Index and the San Joaquin Valley Water Year Index, both of which 
incorporate current and previous year’s water conditions (CDWR 2007).  
5 Because undergraduate admission to UC Davis is more competitive than to CSUS, we had thought that 
experimental results might differ from school to school.  However, there are no significant differences in 
behavior (in terms of market price, quantity traded, or earnings between the experimental sessions run at 
each of the two schools.   Thus no distinction between experimental sessions run at the two universities will 
be made from this point onward.   
  7Buyers and sellers trade water through a non-uniform price double auction according to 
the heterogeneous value functions assigned to them at the start of the session.  However, subjects 
were informed only that they were trading a generic good used as an input into a production 
process which yielded them profits.   
Regardless of the treatment to which they had been randomly assigned, all subjects first 
traded the generic good under conditions of certainty for eight periods, during Part 1 of the 
session.  Each period, subjects learned before trading commenced the size of their initial 
endowment of the good for that period.  The initial endowment of the input good varied from 
period to period depending on the state of nature.  Subjects were informed at the start of each 
period whether the market was in state A, B, or C, corresponding—though unbeknownst to the 
subjects—to dry, normal, and wet years, respectively.
6   
Subjects were randomly assigned to be buyers and sellers.  Sellers could either use their 
initial endowment of the generic good as an input into a production process, for which they 
received profits according to a decreasing marginal cost function, or they could sell some or all 
of their initial endowment to buyers through the auction.  Buyers could supplement their initial 
endowment of the good by purchasing additional units through the auction.  The value and cost 
functions of buyers and sellers were parameterized such that positive gains from trade existed in 
each state of nature.  In each period, the good was automatically used as an input into the 
production of a final good.  Participants were compensated according to their net revenues from 
                                                 
6 There is no banking of water from one period to the next in this experiment.  (The experiment is only 
dynamic in the sense that subjects draw on their experience in previous periods to form expectations about 
market price and quantity.) If our experiment allowed for banking, the effects of supply risk on equilibrium 
price and quantity would diminish, just as the presence of option contracts is shown here to diminish the 
effect of supply risk on equilibrium price and quantity.  This is because option contracts and banking are to 
some extent substitutes for one another.  Option agreements allow agencies to purchase protection from 
water supply risk in the marketplace; banking and reservoir storage minimize excess demand for water in 
the first place. 
 
  8buying and selling the generic good in the auction and from profits from the sale of the final 
good.   
At the conclusion of the training periods, subjects traded in Part 2 for 14 periods 
without knowing their endowment of the generic good.  At the conclusion of each period, 
they learned how large their initial endowment had been at the start of the period and 
what their profits from trade were.  Subjects were informed that each of the three states of 
nature could occur with equal probability and that each period’s state was independent of 
the previous period’s state.  Subjects participated in one of four treatments, which varied 
by market concentration (competitive versus monopsony) and market institution (short-
term contracts versus short-term contracts and option contracts). 
The first treatment (C1) was a competitive market structure with four buyers and four 
sellers.  Although initial endowment size varied from period to period according to the state of 
nature, all subjects within a particular period received the same endowment.  The second 
treatment (DB1) was a dominant buyer market structure with one buyer and four sellers.  A 
dominant buyer’s initial endowment of the generic good was four times as large as that of a 
competitive buyer in the C1 markets. 
In the third treatment (C2), subjects could also buy and sell options on the generic 
good, through a second non-uniform price double auction taking place concurrently with 
the auction for the generic good itself.  Buying an option allowed the buyer to purchase 
an additional unit of the generic good after the state of nature was revealed at the 
conclusion of auction trading, if the buyer elected to do so.  If a buyer elected to exercise 
an option, the seller from whom she had purchased the option consequently had one unit 
of the generic good subtracted from his supply.  In the fourth treatment (DB2), subjects 
  9with the dominant buyer market structure traded options on the generic good as well as 
the generic good itself. 
IV. Results 
Basic experimental results. The experiment consists of 58 market observations 
involving more than 300 participants.  Table 1 indicates the number of market 
observations contained within each treatment cell.  Note that observations within each 
treatment cell use one of two sets of supply and demand functions.  Within set A, the 
supply and demand functions from which buyer and seller marginal benefit and cost 
functions are drawn are symmetric.  Within Set B, the demand function is more inelastic 
than the supply function.  Table 2 indicates predicted prices and trade quantities for each 
market structure, under each state of nature.  The predictions listed in Table 2 are static 
and contain no supply risk.  Maximizing total gains from trade generates the predicted 
competitive price, quantity, and earnings levels; dominant buyer revenue maximization 
generates the dominant buyer predictions.
 7  Having the two sets of supply and demand 
functions allows for a comparison of the effect of supply and demand symmetry on 
market outcomes in the presence of supply risk.  We will see that although the inelastic 
demand function in Set B more realistically models the California water system, the 
subjects converge more quickly on the theoretically predicted price and quantity levels 
with symmetric supply and demand functions. 
Part 1 results. Regardless of treatment, subjects in each market first participated 
in eight periods of trading with no supply risk.  Although this part of the experiment was 
primarily intended as training, the results are interesting nonetheless.  Figure 1 shows 
                                                 
7 Although a dominant buyer in a nonuniform price auction such as this one could in theory perfectly price 
discriminate so as to increase monopsony rents even further, this did not happen in the lab.  
  10average coupon price in the competitive and dominant buyer markets with Set A supply 
and demand functions, for each of the eight periods.  The large squares at the bottom of 
the figure indicate the state of nature (dry, normal, or wet), which was known to the 
subjects during these training periods.  Also included are two sets of hash marks 
indicating the theoretically predicted competitive and dominant buyer equilibrium prices, 
respectively. As the state of nature is known to the subjects while they are trading, price 
is inversely proportional to availability of water in each year.  Subjects appear to 
converge rather quickly on predicted prices.  Figure 2 shows the same information for the 
Set B competitive and dominant buyer markets.  Within Set B markets, there is 
movement towards theoretically predicted prices, though subjects do not converge to 
them as quickly as did the Set A markets.   
Figures 3 and 4 indicate trade quantities for competitive and dominant buyer markets 
with Set A and B supply and demand functions respectively.  The asymmetric supply and 
demand functions also made convergence to the theoretically predicted quantities more difficult. 
Table 3 presents mean values for price, quantity, and market-level earnings for Set A 
competitive and dominant buyer markets.  As these are training periods during which subjects 
are still accustoming themselves to the market environment and their supply and demand 
function parameters, the early periods are noisier than the later periods.  Thus, the values 
reported here are for the last period under each state of nature.  Further, reported prices are the 
last price in each period, in recognition of the fact that there is also a convergence process to a 
market price within each period.  The final two columns of Table 3 contain static predictions for 
market equilibrium conditions under each state of nature.  An asterisk indicates that the 
experimental results are statistically indistinguishable from the associated theoretical predictions 
  11regarding market behavior at the α=0.05 level.  Table 4 contains the same information for Set B 
markets. 
All markets converge to the theoretical price predictions by the conclusion of the training 
periods.  Water quantities traded and earnings levels are generally lower than predicted.  
However, the Set A dominant buyer markets do trade the predicted quantity of water.  Lower 
quantities and earnings are not surprising because the subjects are still acclimating themselves to 
the experiment during the training periods.  However, quantities and earnings levels are also 
lower throughout Part 2 than static predictions would suggest.  If the subjects have mostly 
figured out how the game works by the end of Part 1, then Part 1 is a benchmark level of 
understanding, indicating how much complexity is added to the experiment from the subject 
perspective by the addition of supply risk.   
Part 2 results. The price series in Figure 5 illustrates the change in bidding behavior with 
the introduction of input supply risk.  On the vertical axis of Figure 5 is lab dollars.  On the 
horizontal axis is seconds elapsed in the experiment.  The vertical lines demarcate the 60-second-
long periods; the vertical line at time 0 is the break between Parts 1 and 2.  Now that subjects 
trade water before learning their endowment of water in the current period, price no longer 
responds to variability of water supply.   
Figure 6 graphs average prices.  Each point in Figure 6 is the average of the last 
transaction price within each period, by treatment.
8  Competitive treatment prices are higher on 
average than those of the dominant buyer treatments.  Although the presence of options does not 
seem to affect mean water price, cross-period variability in price does seem to diminish with 
options.  This may indicate that options speed the rate of convergence to water market price.  
                                                 
8 The graph of average water price per period by treatment does not look noticeably different than the graph 
of last water prices in Figure 6. 
  12Also included at the bottom are the averages of the last option transaction prices for each of the 
two treatments where option trading was permitted.  There is a distinct downward movement in 
option price over the course of Part 2.   
Figure 7 indicates the quantity of coupons traded by period for each of the four 
treatments.  The quantities for the two option treatments include exercised options.  The series 
for the two treatments where options were traded have higher variability in number of coupons 
purchased, as subjects in the with-options treatments have the opportunity ex poste to adjust the 
number of coupons they purchase.  Figure 8 indicates how many coupons were purchased for the 
C1 and C2 treatments, and how many options were purchased and exercised in the C2 
treatments.  Figure 9 provides the same information for the dominant buyer treatments.  The state 
of nature in each period is indicated along the x-axis of Figures 8 and 9.  Within both market 
structures, subjects substitute away from water to purchase options when such contracts are 
available to them   Subjects in all treatments tend to exercise their options to purchase water in 
dry years. 
Tables 5 and 6 calculate means for price, quantity, and earnings in each treatment several 
different ways.  Column 1 of Tables 5 and 6 provides raw averages for price, quantity and 
earnings for C1 and C2 markets, and DB1 and DB2 markets, respectively.
9  To account for the 
fact that bidding in the early trading periods is more likely to reflect subject learning than profit-
maximizing trading behavior, the first seven periods of trading are omitted from the averages.  
However, a more refined method for discounting early periods before subjects understand the 
game is to utilize the asymptotic convergence technique of Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995), 
adapted from Ashenfelter (1992).  The formula is as follows: 
                                                 
9 Tables 5 and 6 report price, quantity and earnings levels on the combined data of sets A and B.  Summary 
tables for Sets A and B are also available.  Results for Sets A and B differ in some important ways.  The 
differences are discussed below. 
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where yit is the dependant variable of interest (observed price, quantity of trades or earnings 
level) within market i at time t, and BBit is the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest 
within market i at time t.  The market indicator variable Di is weighted by 1/t, so that later 
periods receive greater weight.  The technique is effectively a weighted fixed effects linear 
regression, with later periods weighted more heavily than earlier periods, where all markets 
within a treatment are forced to converge to a single coefficient, B2
B .  The asymptotic coefficient 
BB2 from this convergence process for C1 and C2, and for DB1 and DB2, are reported in Column 
2 of Tables 5 and 6, respectively.   
We adapt the formula to our setting, as price, quantity, and earnings levels are influenced 
by the stochastic realization of available water supply from period to period, as well as by 
interaction between subjects within a market and the process of learning how the market works.  
In calculating the asymptotic coefficient for water price and number of trades in each treatment, 
we control for lagged water year, in recognition of the possibility that subjects formulate their 
expectations regarding current period’s water price with the previous water year conditions in 
mind.  In calculating the asymptotic coefficient for earnings in each treatment, we control for 
current water year.  We also control for water year in calculating quantity of options exercised, 
as this decision is made ex poste, with full knowledge of current water supply conditions.  Means 
reported in Column 3 are generated by the same convergence technique, now controlling for 
autocorrelation and cross-market heteroskedasticity. 
One measure of the experimental results is whether they conform to theoretical 
expectations of what water and option prices, number of water and option trades, and earnings 
levels will be, given the market structure and contract offerings within each treatment.  
  14According to the rational expectations model of behavior, subjects will purchase water and 
options at prices and quantities which maximize expected profits.  Column 4 of Tables 5 and 6 
gives theoretical predictions of price, quantity, and earnings levels for C1 and C2 and DB1 and 
DB2 markets respectively, which assumes that subjects play as if each year will be an average 
water year.  Column 5 of Tables 5 and 6 indicates that for no treatment do experimental results 
match the predictions in Column 4.  Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) similarly find that their 
experimental results do not conform to theoretical predictions.  Our experiment has the added 
complication of water supply risk.  Finding that our subjects do not conform to static theoretical 
expectations is thus definitely no surprise.  One pattern observed thus far is the tendency of 
participants to smooth consumption over time rather than maximize net present value. 
However, although price, quantity and earnings levels do not match these particular 
predictions, the convergence coefficients in Column 3 of Tables 5 and 6 can still be compared to 
each other.  Parametric and non-parametric comparisons of equilibrium price, quantity, and 
subject earnings indicate the relative efficiency of the four treatments.  Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 
provide a graphical representation of the point estimates for price, water quantity, option 
quantity, and earnings levels in Column 3 of Tables 5 and 6.  All coefficients are statistically 
significantly different from one another at the α=0.05 level.   
Result 1. The presence of a dominant buyer in the market induces lower water price and 
fewer trades relative to the competitive case.  This is definitely the case.  Price, quantity, and 
earnings levels for DB1 are lower than for C1, within both Sets A and B.   
Result 2. In both the competitive and dominant buyer cases, the presence of options 
generally induces lower water price and fewer trades.  This is generally found to be true, though 
  15for competitive Set B markets, the presence of options increases water price very slightly.  For 
dominant buyer Set B markets, the presence of options increases the number of water trades.   
Result 3. In markets where options may be traded, the presence of a dominant buyer in 
the market induces lower option price and fewer option trades.  Results regarding the interaction 
of the dominant buyer and the presence of options are mixed.  Within Set A, option prices with a 
dominant buyer are lower, and quantities of options purchased and exercised are both higher, 
than with a competitive market structure.  Within Set B, dominant buyer option prices are higher 
and quantities of options purchased and exercised are lower than competitive option prices and 
quantities.   
Result 4. In both the competitive and dominant buyer cases, allowing options to be traded 
increases efficiency, as measured by market earnings.  Earnings are higher in dominant buyer 
option treatments and in competitive option treatments within Set A.  Earnings for the 
competitive option treatments within Set B are lower than earnings for the competitive no option 
treatments within Set B.  Judicious removal of outliers may shed some light on whether the 
different results from Sets A and B are due to different supply and demand functions or due to 
insufficient data.  Putting aside this issue for the moment, Table 7 indicates that for pooled data 
set, the presence of options increases market earnings on average by 11% for the competitive 
markets and 21% for the dominant buyer markets.  
V. Conclusion 
This analysis provides practical insights into the design of water options markets, 
by isolating the effects of market concentration and the availability of different contract 
instruments on the efficiency of markets.  Earnings of subjects within the laboratory 
setting increase on average by 11% for competitive markets and by 21% for dominant 
  16buyer markets.  There are some unusually high and low changes in earnings within these 
averages.  Work continues on understanding the experimental results.   
The experimental markets described here are thin, as are the wholesale water 
markets they are intended to represent.  Although the experimental setting abstracts away 
from many features of a real water market, the laboratory results do show that it is 
possible for thin markets to converge to relatively competitive price and quantity levels in 
the presence of input supply risk. 
Water policymakers throughout the western United States are thinking about ways 
to manage the next multi-year drought.  When California next experiences a series of dry 
years, CDWR and other policymakers within the state may once again consider a market 
for water options, as they last did in 1994-95, so that negotiations occur well in advance 
of need and sellers are reimbursed for adopting supply risk.  Our future research in this 
vein may explore the effect of the variance of water supply on option price and quantity 
traded, as well as the relationship between annual options and multiple-exercise options 
which can be exercised a pre-specified number of times over the course of a longer-term 
contract.  
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Table 1. Experimental Sessions Summary 
          
Set A Supply and Demand Functions (symmetric)   





State UC  Davis  Total
C1a No  No  4  4  8 
C2a No  Yes  4  4  8 
DB1a Yes  No  6  6  12 
DB2a Yes  Yes  7  5  12 
         
Set B Supply and Demand Functions (asymmetric)   
      Number of Observations 
 
Dominant 
Buyer  Options 
Sacramento 
State  UC Davis  Total
         
C1b No  No  2  2  4 
C2b No  Yes  3  2  5 
DB1b Yes  No  2  2  4 






Table 2. Theoretical Predictions with No Supply Risk 
        
Set A  Price  Quantity 
    C  DB C DB 
Dry 96  85  13  8 
Normal 80  66  13  8 
Wet   64  53  13  8 
        
Set B  Price  Quantity 
    C  DB C DB 
Dry 105  94  16  12 
Normal 80  74  13  10 
Wet   60  52  9  7 
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Table 3. Price, Quantity, and Earnings Results with No Supply Risk, Set A 
   Experimental Results    Predictions 
   Comp   Discrim. DB    Comp  Discrim. DB 
Last Dry Year (Period 8)           
  Last Water Price  94.63*  85.29*    96  85 
   (6.63)  (16.87)       
  Number of Trades  10.63  6.88*    13  8 
   (2.13)  (3.13)       
 Earnings  -1132  -1184    -1086  -1128 
   (31.6)  (77.45)       
Last Normal Year (Period 7)           
  Last Water Price  77.75*  68.71*    80  66 
   (7.43)  (10.8)       
  Number of Trades  10.81  7.13*    13  8 
   (2.01)  (3.78)       
 Earnings  269  219    318  276 
   (49.21)  (89.68)       
Last Wet Year (Period 6)           
  Last Water Price  68.06*  55.58*    64  53 
   (7.77)  (12.23)       
  Number of Trades  9.88  7.63*    13  8 
   (1.20)  (3.31)       
 Earnings  1415  1379    1466  1424 
   (29.56)  (77.66)       
           
Last Water Price is the average price of the last transaction in the period for all markets 
within the relevant treatments.  (Last Water Price of 94.63 is the average last price of all 
markets in CB1a and CB2a; because options have not yet been introduced, these two 
treatments are as yet indistinguishable.)  Number of trades is the average number of 
trades in the period for all markets within the relevant treatments.  Earnings is the 
average of market-wide earnings of all markets within the relevant treatments. 
For competitive market descriptive statistics, n=16; for dominant buyer markets, n=24. 
Standard errors of the averages are in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates that the 
experimental result is not significantly different than the relevant theoretical predictions, at 
a significance level of α=.05.  
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Table 4. Price, Quantity, and Earnings Results with No Supply Risk, Set B 
   Experimental Results    Predictions 
   Comp   Discrim. DB    Comp  Discrim. DB 
Last Dry Year (Period 8)           
  Last Water Price  96.33*  83.88*    105  94 
   (24.44)  (14.48)       
  Number of Trades  11.67  5.63    16  12 
   (2.60)  (3.38)       
 Earnings  -1069  -1387    -916  -1804 
   (125.65)  (270.09)       
Last Normal Year (Period 7)           
  Last Water Price  82.67*  65.33*    80  74 
   (7.75)  (10.92)       
  Number of Trades  11.33  6.78    13  10 
   (1.50)  (3.83)       
 Earnings  493  376.00    546  525 
   (28.91)  (174.67)       
Last Wet Year (Period 6)           
  Last Water Price  64.56*  50*    60  52 
   (13.33)  (7.53)       
  Number of Trades  8.78*  5.11    9  7 
   (2.22)  (2.15)       
 Earnings  1593  1566    1644  1356 
   (39.70)  (63.64)       
            
Last Water Price is the average price of the last transaction in the period for all markets 
within the relevant treatments.  Number of trades is the average number of trades in the 
period for all markets within the relevant treatments.  Earnings is the average of market-
wide earnings of all markets within the relevant treatments. 
For competitive and dominant buyer market descriptive statistics, n=9.  Standard errors of 
the averages are in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates that the experimental result is not 
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Table 5. Price, Quantity, and Earnings for Competitive Market Treatments, All Data 
         
















Water Price  85.27  86.34  85.55  80  <0.005 
 (11.25)  (1.38)  (0.17)     
 12  168  168     
Water Quantity  7.98  10.28  10.19  13  <0.005 
 (2.29)  (0.18)  (0.12)     
 13  168  168     
Earnings -177  224 225  386  <0.005 
 (51.03)  (11.41)  (13.04)     
 12  168  168     
          
















Water Price  85.27  85.52  86.93  80  <0.005 
 (11.25)  (2.32)  (0.08)     
 12  182  182     
Water Quantity  7.98  8.03  7.94  13  <0.005 
 (2.29)  (0.22)  (0.08)     
 13  182  182     
Earnings -116  258  256  386  <0.005 
 (109.84)  (16.22)  (5.59)     
 13  182  182     
Option Price  38.07  34.6  31.81  8  <0.005 
 (55.93)  (7.58)  (2.33)     
 13  165  84     
Option Quantity  3.02  3  4.34  3  <0.005 
 (1.89)  (0.20)  (0.19)     
 13  182  84     
9.55 10.01  9.98  16  <0.005  Water and Exercised 
Option Quantity  (2.08)  (0.22)  (0.07)     
 13  182  182     
Convergence coefficients are estimated by the weighted fixed-effects technique described in the text. 
Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates; below standard errors are sample sizes. 
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Table 6. Price, Quantity, and Earnings for Competitive Market Treatments, All Data 
          
















Water Price  84.66  67.71  70.33  74  <0.005 
 (14.07)  (1.44)  (0.09)     
 13  223  196     
Water Quantity  7.52  7.5  7.85  10  <0.005 
 (3.23)  (0.24)  (0.08)     
 16  223  196     
Earnings -244  165 160  365  <0.005 
 (72.91)  (10.06)  (12.51)     
 16  224  224     
















Water Price  73.87  73.63  76.66  74  <0.005 
 (10.23)  (0.76)  (0.05)     
 17  225  168     
Water Quantity  6.28  6.46  7.37  10  <0.005 
 (2.78)  (0.23)  (0.08)     
 17  225  168     
Earnings -168  212 210  365  <0.005 
 (205.48)  (18.78)  (5.22)     
 17  238  238     
Option Price  33.32  29.86  19.26  5  <0.005 
 (30.65)  (2.49)  (0.56)     
 14  166  84     
Option Quantity  3.09  3.09  5.43  2  <0.005 
 (3.13)  (0.24)  (0.40)     
 17  236  84     
8.21 8.24  9.14  12  <0.005  Water and Exercised 
Option Quantity  (3.47) (0.29)  (0.09)    
 17  225  168     
Convergence coefficients are estimated by the weighted fixed-effects technique described in the text. 
Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates; below standard errors are sample sizes. 
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Table 7. Percentage Increase in Earnings Resulting 
from Presence of Option Contracts 
Competitive Treatments     
 Set  A 
Set 
B  Sets A and B 
C1 -254  331  225 
C2 229  311  256 
Expected Earnings  227  386  284 
Percentage Change  213%  -5%  11% 
      
Dominant Buyer Treatments     
 Set  A 
Set 
B  Sets A and B 
DB1 -112  190  160 
DB2 -59  274  210 
Expected Earnings  185  365  234 
Percentage Change  29%  23%  21% 
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Figure 1. 
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C1 Trades (Water Only)
C2 Trades (Water and Exercised Options)
DB1 Trades (Water Only)
DB2 Trades (Water and Exercised Options)
Figure 8. 
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Set B Set A Sets A and B
Figure 12.  
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